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A CANAL ACROSS NICARAGUA
By HELMUTH W. ENGELMAN
IT MAY be remembered that not so long ago therewas much discussion of a Nicaraguan Canal. Fora time, it dropped from the public mind, but now
it is rising again. Xhere is a possibility that something
may be done about it in the near future. With every-
one worried about national defense and South Amer-
ican trade, and so on, the possibility is becoming a
good one.
The purpose of such a canal would be dual. Its
commercial possibilities are the more apparent benefit,
but its advantage in the matter of national defense
should not be overlooked. The Panama Canal is at
present able to take care of all trade without trouble.
It is predicted that at the present rate of increase in
the size of ocean vessels, the present canal will be
overworked in about 1970. Granted that this is a
long way off. Even so, it must be remembered that
if something is done, it will take longer than one year,
or two, to accomplish much in the way of a project
the size of an interoceanic canal. To add a third set
of locks at Panama, which offers one solution, would
take ten years, mainly, of course, because regular opera-
tion could not be interfered with. A canal across
Nicaragua could be finished in an equal length of time.
That already brings us to 1960, which is only twenty
years from now.
From the commercial standpoint, probably the third
set of locks would be the most practical solution. Cost
would be $582,000,000 less. It would increase the
annual tonnage of Panama from 41,000,000 to over
54,000,000 tons. This would be sufficient for at least
a time, and since the locks would probably be large
enough to handle anything afloat, would enable the
Panama Canal to handle any ships regardless of size.
It is mainly with regard to defense that the Nicara-
guan Canal would be of immediate use. Two canals
would obviously be able to pass far more ships than one.
This would be in keeping with our policy of one fleet
for two oceans. With only those ships necessary to
coastal defense in one ocean, a large enough fleet
could be assembled in the other to wreak some worth-
while havoc. It would be difficult, but not a practical
impossibility, to tie up the Panama Canal by sabotage.
To attempt it with two canals simultaneously, as sep-
arated as the two would be an incredible job. One water-
way might be stopped, but the possibility of one remain-
ing open is better than would be the possibility with
one canal. It is in the opening days of a war that the
canal service would be vital. It would enable our
fleet to choose its theater of operations in either ocean,
whichever seemed the most decisive. If, in those first









enemy might be possible.
The Nicaraguan Canal Zone would not be deter-
mided as was the Panama Zone, by setting the boundary
a certain distance from the canal. The Nicaraguan
Zone will be determined from the standpoint of de-
fense. This is one of the things learned at Panama.
Part of the zone would have to be in Costa Rica. (See
map).
A little of the history of the situation would not be
out of place. There were, at first, four main possible
canal routes across Central America, with variations
to each. Of these, only two are actually feasible, the
one being at Panama, and the other via Lake Nicaragua.
It was proposed at one time that at the isthmus of Da-
rien, a canal should be built which called for tunnels
in the mountains large enough for ships to go through.
Then, also, there was the plan to cross the Mexican
Isthmus of Tehuantepec. This called for flat cars
large enough for a ship to be loaded upon, which would
be pulled across the mountains, the ship being relaunched
upon arrival at the opposite ocean. It is almost needless
to say that we will probably dig our canals, both now
and in the future, and that we will also stay away from
tunnels.
The Pacific end of the Nicaraguan Canal would be
at Brito. The Pacific and Lake Nicaragua could be
very easily connected at that place. Eastward from
the lake, the canal would follow the San Juan river
part way to the Atlantic. At about halfway, it would
take a short cut and emerge at Greytown on the At-
lantic coast. This is shown on the map. A dam would
keep the canalized part of the San Juan at the proper
level.
The lake is at a mean level of about 104 feet. This
would mean locking in three steps. Estimates of con-
struction cost are based on placing a flight of three
twin locks at each end of the canal. They would,
naturally, be some distance inland. Their location is
shown on the map. The advantages of this type of
lock are numerous. The initial and maintenance costs
are less, and there is less time needed for the ship to
pass through, because it has to be made fast only once,
instead of three times. This also reduces the danger
of locking, since it is at the approach that accidents
usually occur, when a ship strikes wingwalls, or an
abutment. To put a flight of three locks together re-
quires a good rock foundation, which just happens to
be available.
The dimensions of the locks have been determined
from commercial rather than naval considerations. The
size of commercial vessels is expected to increase far
more than that of naval vessels. The locks at Panama
are 1,000 ft. long, 110 ft. wide, and 41 ft. deep on
the miter sills. The draft of ships is not expected to
increase appreciably because of draft limitations in
harbors, but it is expected that the canal in the year
2,000 would be called upon to transit a ship 1,125 ft.
long and with 120 ft. beam. For this reason the
Nicaraguan locks would be 1,200 ft. long, 125 ft.
wide, and sill depth of 42.5 ft. More important than
this "largest ship" consideration, however, is the con-
trolling capacity of the two canals combined. In the
Nicaraguan locks, ships of a combined length of 1,000
ft. could be locked in tandem. This means that dur-
ing periods of lock overhaul, annual tonnage of 80,000,-
000 tons could be reached, with normal capacity of
160,000,000 tons. By minor readjustments during the
overhaul period, the controlling capacity of the two
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The jungle was thick along the San Juan
River
canals would be about 200,000,000 tons, which is con-
sidered to be enough for the next century or more.
Needless to say, there are numerous features which
would differ from those at Panama. But these would
not be new risks; experience has dictated the changes.
Experience has shown the needs of personnel, con-
siderations of health, etc. It is expected that venereal
diseases will cause most of the trouble in Nicaragua, the
mosquito situation being controllable without great dif-
ficulty.
The canal would take about ten years to build, and
about five years prior to building for treaties and neces-
sary legislation. It would cost about $722,000,000.
Operation and maintenance would be $10,800,000
yearly, but this would not be an outlay. Most of the
traffic now using the Panama Canal would have a
shorter route through Nicaragua, and more trade would
be able to use both canals, especially our own inter-
coastal commerce. It would be hoped that this canal
would foster friendlier relations with the rest of the
Americas, and thus serve a diplomatic mission as well
as a physical one.i
The writer wishes to express his personal apprecia-
tion to two members of the department of Military
Science for their kindness in giving material on the sub-
ject. Capt. W. E. Potter was a member of the
original expedition which determined the canal route
in 1929-31, and was the first engineer of the Hydro-
graphic Survey, which keeps records of lake level, rain-
fall, etc., for canal purposes. Capt. Lyle E. Seeman
served as engineer of the survey during a following
year.
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